Re: ppc warnings

[Jack Howarth <howarth at fuse dot net>]

Roland,
     Doh. I am using the log from the glibc-2.3 debian cvs which
includes their proposed patches for the debian glibc 2.3 package.
I think the offender is in attached glibc22-getdents-fix.dpatch
they are using.
                                   Jack

On Tue, 2002-09-03 at 00:10, Roland McGrath wrote:

> 
> > .../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/getdents.c: In function `__getdents':
> > ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/getdents.c:171: warning: comparison of
> > distinct pointer types lacks a cast
> > ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/getdents.c:231: warning: comparison of
> > distinct pointer types lacks a cast
> 
> That does not happen for me.  I am using the gcc-3.2 in debian sid.
> You must be using some different options or something.  Send config.status.

#! /bin/sh -e

# All lines beginning with `# DP:' are a description of the patch.
# DP: A patch I got from Trond Myklebust to fix NFS problems

if [ $# -ne 2 ]; then
    echo >&2 "`basename $0`: script expects -patch|-unpatch as argument"
    exit 1
fi
case "$1" in
    -patch) patch -d "$2" -f --no-backup-if-mismatch -p1 < $0;;
    -unpatch) patch -d "$2" -f --no-backup-if-mismatch -R -p1 < $0;;
    *)
	echo >&2 "`basename $0`: script expects -patch|-unpatch as argument"
	exit 1
esac
exit 0

# append the patch here and adjust the -p? flag in the patch calls.
--- glibc-2.2.2/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/getdents.c~	Tue Feb 20 14:53:40 2001
+++ glibc-2.2.2/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/getdents.c	Tue Feb 20 14:59:46 2001
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
 #endif
 
 #define offsetof(TYPE, MEMBER) ((size_t) &((TYPE *)0)->MEMBER)
+#define test_overflow(VAR, SIZE) ((((VAR) < 0 ? -(VAR):(VAR)) >> 8*(SIZE)) != 0)
+
 
 extern int __syscall_getdents (int fd, char *__unbounded buf, unsigned int nbytes);
 extern int __syscall_getdents64 (int fd, char *__unbounded buf, unsigned int nbytes);
@@ -98,7 +100,6 @@
 __GETDENTS (int fd, char *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
   DIRENT_TYPE *dp;
-  off64_t last_offset = -1;
   ssize_t retval;
 
 #ifdef __NR_getdents64
@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@
 # endif
 	{
 	  struct kernel_dirent64 *kdp;
+	  int64_t last_offset = 0;
 	  const size_t size_diff = (offsetof (struct kernel_dirent64, d_name)
 				    - offsetof (DIRENT_TYPE, d_name));
 
@@ -157,12 +159,12 @@
 	      if ((sizeof (dp->d_ino) != sizeof (kdp->d_ino)
 		   && dp->d_ino != d_ino)
 		  || (sizeof (dp->d_off) != sizeof (kdp->d_off)
-		      && dp->d_off != d_off))
+		      && test_overflow(d_off, sizeof(dp->d_off))))
 		{
 		  /* Overflow.  If there was at least one entry
 		     before this one, return them without error,
 		     otherwise signal overflow.  */
-		  if (last_offset != -1)
+		  if (dp != buf)
 		    {
 		      __lseek64 (fd, last_offset, SEEK_SET);
 		      return (char *) dp - buf;
@@ -193,6 +195,7 @@
   {
     size_t red_nbytes;
     struct kernel_dirent *skdp, *kdp;
+    __kernel_off_t last_offset = 0;
     const size_t size_diff = (offsetof (DIRENT_TYPE, d_name)
 			      - offsetof (struct kernel_dirent, d_name));
 
@@ -221,7 +224,7 @@
 	  {
 	    /* Our heuristic failed.  We read too many entries.  Reset
 	       the stream.  */
-	    assert (last_offset != -1);
+	    assert (dp != buf);
 	    __lseek64 (fd, last_offset, SEEK_SET);
 
 	    if ((char *) dp == buf)