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BSD TCP/IP Stack & SYN Flooding
- From: "Rene Nielsen" <rbn at vitesse dot com>
- To: <ecos-discuss at sourceware dot org>
- Date: Mon, 25 May 2009 10:15:40 +0200
- Subject: [ECOS] BSD TCP/IP Stack & SYN Flooding
Hi folks,
I have a question regarding TCP SYN Flooding attacks.
To my understanding these attacks come in two flavors:
1) The attacker sends SYN packets only, leaving the connection
half-open.
2) The attacker sends SYN packets and ACKs the SYN-ACK from the server,
effectively opening the connection (this is probably not a real SYN
flood attack, but nevertheless it takes server-side resources...).
Are there any remedies in the eCos' BSD TCP/IP stack to overcome such
attacks (e.g. SYN cache/cookies as suggested by RFC4987 to remedy attack
type #1, timeouts, etc.)?
Regards,
Rene Schipp von Branitz Nielsen
Vitesse Semiconductors
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